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Thirty years ago, in Monroe v. Pape ,1 the United States Su-
preme Court first addressed the question of whether or not abuses 
committed by state police officers were subject to suit under the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, popularly known as Section 1983.2 
Monroe presented allegations of police abuse in a quintessential 
form: several heavily armed police officers broke into the plaintiffs' 
home without a judicial warrant , ransacked the house and terror-
ized the occupants, making racial and other derogatory slurs as 
they proceeded in their search. No contraband was found and no 
arrests were made. 3 
The Supreme Court ruled that these allegations stated a cause 
of action under Section 1983 for the violation of the plaintiffs' 
Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that the phrase "under 
color of state law" in Section 1983 was intended to include actions 
undertaken by government officials without state approval or au-
thorization.4 Most incidents of police abuse involve the actions of 
officers who act contrary to state Jaw, and , in determining that 
Section 1983 was intended to counter these violations, the Court 
held out the promise of an effective federal remedy for police 
abuse. 
Unfortunately, the expectations engendered by Monroe have 
not been fully realized. After three decades and much constitu-
* Partner, Kairys & Rudovsky; Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania School of 
Law; B.A. Queens College (CUNY) ; LL.B. 1967, New York University School of Law. I 
am proud to contribute to an issue of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law R evie1v 
honoring Norman Dorsen , whose contribution s to civil libe rtie s over the past three decades 
are legion. Starting with my fellowship in the Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program 
at NYU in 1966-67 , I, like many of my colleagues, have greatly benefited from Norman 
Dorsen's unmatched skills as a teacher, lawyer and civil libe rtarian. 
1 365 U.S. 167 (1961) , overmled in part , Monell v. New York Dep ' t of Social Servs. , 
436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
~ 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 (1988) , originall y enacted as ~ I of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 , 
ch. 22 , § 1, 17 Stat. 13 . 
3 365 U.S. a t 169. 
4 ld. at 183-85. 
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tiona! litigation,5 the abuses continue , in many ways unabated. 
The beating of Rod ney K ing by Los Angeles police in 1991 and 
the highly controversial acquittal of the officers involved focused 
attention once again on the problem of police abuse and demon-
strated the continuing existence of the practices and policies that 
cause it. 
Almost everyone who viewed the tape of the K ing beating 
was appalled by the display of senseless brutality. While some 
attem pted to explain or defend the police ac tions , the evidence of 
brutality and abuse was so strong that a defense was rendered 
implausible. 6 The incident had the earmarks of classic police 
abuse: extremely excessive force used by white officers against a 
black suspect, an event infused with racism, and carried out with 
an attitude of impunity. For some , the event echoed numerous 
similar events in the past. Res ponding to the King incident, New 
York City Po lice Commissioner Lee P. Brown declared that " the 
prob lem of excessive fo rce in American policing is real. "7 For 
many others, it was a first-time eyeopener, a window into a world 
of official violence that could not be squared with our cultural and 
political norms. 8 
The bookends of Mon roe v. Pape and Rodney King embrace 
volumes of law and politics. An essential question that emerges 
5 See , e.g ., Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97 ( 1976) (Eighth Amendment); Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Ame ndmen t); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967) (Fourth Amendment); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I (1985) (Fourth Amendment). 
Se e also HatTy A. Blackmun , S ec rion 1983 and Federa l Protecrion of Individual Rights-
Will rhe Srawre R emain Alive or Fade Away 7 , 60 N .Y.U . L. REv. I , 19-20 (1985). 
6 See generally Report of the Independent Commi ss ion on the Los Angeles Police 
Department (1991) (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law R eview) 
[hereinafter LAIC]. 
7 Geo rge James, Police Chief s Call jiJr U.S. to Study Use of Force , N.Y. TIM ES , Apr. 
17 , 1991, at B3. 
~ Judge Alex Kozinski of the United State s Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
stated: 
[F]or a lot of naive people, including me, [the King case] puts a real doubt on the 
posture of prosecutors that police are disin te res ted civ il servants just " telling it as 
it is ." 
We should have known all along what this incide nt points out : that police get 
invol ved in what they do and that they are participants in the process just like 
anyo ne e lse. T hey are subject to bias and the y do have a stake in the outcome. 
Darlene Ricker, Behind th e Silence, 77 A.B .A. J. 45. 4/l (1991). This observation was 
fore shadowed by Justice Jac kson 's important insight, made over forty yea rs ea rlier, that, 
in considering Fourth Amendment claims , we should be fully aware that the police are 
in volved in the "often competiti ve ent erprise of ferret ing out crime." Jo hn son v. U nited 
States, 333 U.S. 10 , 14 (1948). 
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from this thirty-year period is whether the institutions, programs 
and principles we have developed to empower the police are also 
adequate to the task of controlling the police. We must also ask 
whether in our society, which relies substantially on the courts to 
regulate and control governmental behavior, the legal response to 
police abuse is sufficiently sensitive to the institutional nature of 
the problem. 
Enforcing the proper restraints on police power is a difficult 
problem in any society. In the United States there is both a fear 
of governmental abuse and a tolerance of repressive measures, the 
latter reflecting a belief that police excesses are necessary to com-
bat crime. 9 The pervasiveness of violence, the lack of social co-
hesiveness, racial and ethnic discrimination , and sharp disparitie s 
in privilege, wealth and power supply a fertile ground for crime 
and social unrest. Frustration with disorder and crime in turn leads 
to a public acceptance of extra-constitutional police practices. 
Because police abuse is most often directed against those without 
political power or social status, their complaints are often dis-
missed or ignored. 
Acceptance of a certain level of police abuse is a predictable 
majoritarian response to crime, upheaval and threats to the status 
quo. The true test of our society's commitment to constitutional 
constraints is how government and the courts respond to these 
systemic deviations from constitutional norms. If we examine cur-
rent police conduct in light of this test, it is clear the response of 
government and the courts has been insufficient. We have mani-
fested an indifference to documented abuses, and we have fostered 
official violence through social, political and legal structures that 
9 While most commentators condemn proven cases of police abuse , excuses are still 
made. For example, in the aftermath of the highly publicized beating of Rodney King , 
syndicated columnist Patrick Buchanan wrote: 
In our polarized a nd violent society, most Americans have come to look upon the 
cops as "us," and upon King , a convicted felon , as "them." H e is the enemy in a 
war we are losing , badly ; and we have come to believe the cops a re our las t line 
of defense. 
Patrick J. Buchanan, The Police Are the Last Line of Defense, L. A. TIMES, Mar. I 0, 1991, 
at MS. 
Al so writing after the King beating , another commentator wrote: "[T]he tape of some 
Los Angeles-a rea cops giving the what-for to an ex-con ... is not a pleasant sight, of 
course ; neither is cancer surgery. Did they hit him too man y tim es'~ Sure , but tha t' s not 
the issue: it 's safe s treets versus urban terror." Llewe ll yn H. Rockwe ll, If's Safe Streets 
Versus Urban Terror , L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991 , at MS. 
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reinforce patterns of unlawfulness . We know much about the prin-
ciples of accountability and organizational control, yet we often 
fail to apply these basic precepts to law enforcement officials 10 
In order to explore the sharply differing perceptions of the 
nature of police abuse and analyze the contemporary legal and 
political disputes over thi s profoundly difficult problem, it is help-
ful to consider an updated version of Monroe v. Pape. 
II. Metropoli s, U .S.A ., 1992 
Metropolis , a la rge urban area, like many of its sister cities 
across the country, has over the pas t fifteen years experienced an 
increase in crime and has suffered the pernicious effects of drugs, 
unemployment and poverty. T he police department is structured 
and operated along the lines of most large city departments. It has 
devoted an increasing amount of resources to training and super-
vision, and has recruited and hired additional minority members. 
The training program is well in line with professional standards, 
setting forth the appropriate constitutional standards for the use 
of police powers.'' 
The police are under substantial pressure to control and deter 
violent crime and illicit drug transactions. A special narcotics 
squad with city-wide jurisdiction has been established to combat 
drug activity. Members of this squad report only to the Unit Com-
mander. The squad is responsible for building intelligence with 
respect to drug activity, conducting raids of suspected drug loca-
tions , recruiting informants and targeting areas that have signifi-
cant drug and drug-related problems. 
10 See, e.g., JEROME H . SKO LN ICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AN D 
ExcESS IVE UsE OF FoRCE (forthcoming from Free Press 1992) (on fil e with the author); 
KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, PoLICE DISCRETION (1975). See also Susan Sturm, Resolving the 
Remedial Dilemma: S trategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA . L. REv. 805 
(1990). 
11 There are no binding national standards fo r police offi cer training. Each jurisd iction 
se ts it s own requirements , but a ll req uire a course of instruction in constitutional law. 
Metropolitan police forces typically exceed their state's minimum requirements. For ex-
ample , the Bos ton Police Academy, whil e required to offer 420 training hours to rec ruits , 
provides over 800 hours of tra ining, which includes approximately thirty hours of consti-
tutional law. Instruction primarily consists of lec tures conducted by the Constitutional Law 
Instructor, who is both a lawye r and a police offi cer. Police offi cers also recei ve annual 
updates. Telephone Intervi ew with Lt. James Moore , Constitutional Law Instructor, Boston 
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The nation is involved in a "war on drugs . " 12 Congress and 
state legislatures have given the police and prosecution a powerful 
array of new law enforcement measures. 13 At the same time, the 
Supreme Court has drastically limited the substantive protections 
of the Fourth Amendment14 and has significantly narrowed the 
exclusionary rule, 15 thus authorizing increasingly invasive police 
searches, seizures and other investigative practices. 
Enormous sums of money have been ex pended on the drug 
war, primarily on the law enforcement side of the equation. 16 
Between 1975 and 1990, there has been a three-fold increase in 
the number of prisoners in the United States; in 1992 we hold well 
over a million people behind bars, the largest prison population 
per capita of any industrialized country. 17 The war on drugs is 
" The "war on drugs" was officially declared by President Ronald Reagan on October 
14, 1982 in a speech to the United States Department of Justice. Les lie Maitland, President 
Gives Plan to Combat Drug Networks, N.Y. TIMES , Oct. 15, 1982, at AI. See also THE 
WHITE HoUSE , NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY (1989). 
13 See generally MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT , AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: 
A COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL RATES OF IN CARCERATION 7-11 (1991); Paul Finkel-
man , The War on Defense Lawyers , in NEW FRONTIERS IN DRUG PoucY 113 (A.S. Trebach 
& K.B. Zeese eels., 1991); Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The 
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for R eform , 136 U. PA. L. REV . 1783 (1988); 
David Rudovsky, The Right to Counsel Under Attack, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1965 (1988); 
United States v. Monsanto , 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
14 See , e.g. , Florida v. Bostick , Ill S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (holding that searches of 
consenting bus passenger's luggage without articulable suspicion not per se unconstitu-
tional); California v. Hodari D., Ill S. Ct. 1547 (1991); Michigan Dep ' t of State Police v. 
Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656 (1989). 
15 See, e .g., United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that exclusionary rule 
should not a pply to evidence obtained by officers reasonably relying on a search warrant 
ultima tely found to be invalid); Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. 
Calandra , 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
16 At the federal level, total funding for drug enforcement was $4.6 billion in 1985, $6.6 
billion in 1989 and $8.2 billion in 1992. The proposed budget for 1993 has earmarked $8.6 
billion for drug enforcement efforts. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF 
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1993 , 190 (1992). There are substantial 
additional costs for the courts, prosecutors, appointed counsel and the prisons. On the 
state and local level, a 1987 study by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates esti-
mated state and local police expenditures (not including outlays for courts and prisons) at 
$5 billion for 1985. Ethan A. Nadelma nn, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, 
Consequences , and Alternatives, 245 SciENCE 939, 940 (1989) . State spending on prisons 
today is twelve times what it was just twent y years ago. Neal Pierce, Filling Our Prisons 
Isn't Deterring Crim es, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 13 , 1992 , at 7A. Far less money is spent on 
drug rehabilitation and education programs. See Larry Gostin, Th e Interconnected Epidem-
ics of Drug Dependency and AIDS , 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 113 (1991); MAUER, supra 
note II , at 13; MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: ONE 
YEAR LATER 9 (Feb. 1992) (hereinafter MA UER 1992 UPDATE). See also BUDGET OF TH E 
UNITED STATES GovERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1993, supra, a t 190. 
17 MAUER, supra note II , at 4, 6; Pierce , supra note 16 , at 7 A. 
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largely accountable for this development , due to greater numbers 
of arrests and significantly increased sentences caused by man-
datory minimum sentences and guideline sentencing schemes. 1s 
Whatever the merits of this heavy-on-enforcement approach (and 
the results certainly justify acute skepticism), 19 the directives to 
police forces around the country have been unambiguous: it is a 
war, and virtually any means will be tolerated on the battlefield . 
The Metropoli s narcotics squad has for the past six months 
investigated drug selling in the Circle Park section, a predomi-
nantly African-American , lower-income neighborhood. Com-
plai nts by community residents and articles in the city newspaper 
have led to heightened police concern over the drug problem in 
this area. Rumors have associated Charles and Linda Raft with 
known drug sellers . To secure further information about these 
individuals, the police decide to arrest Robe rt Castle, a convicted 
drug abuser, who they believe is a friend of the Rafts. The police 
arrest Castle on fal se charges and tell him that things will go much 
better for him if he cooperates in the investigation of the Rafts. 
Castle agrees to cooperate and tells the police that cocaine is stored 
in the Raft residence and that he has seen them sell the drug as 
recently as two weeks before. Based on these assertions, the police 
obtain a warrant to search the Rafts' home. 20 
18 See Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars, 6 CRIMIN AL J USTI CE 12 , 16-17 , 38 (1992) ; 
MAUER 1992 UPDATE, supra note 16, a t 7-9. 
19 See generally Michael Levine, Th e Drug "War": Fight It At Home , N.Y. TIMES , 
Feb. 16 , 1992, at E15; Nadelma nn , supra note 16 ; John Kaplan , Taking Drugs Seriously, 
THE Pus uc INTEREST , Summer 1988, a t 32; Milton Friedman , A War We 're Losing, WALL 
ST. J. , Mar. 7, 1991 , at Al4; STEVEN WrsoTSKY , BEYOND THE WAR ON DRuGs (Prometheus 
Books 1990) (1986). See also Gost in , supra note 16 (arguing that this "penal" approach to 
controlling drug abuse has greatly contributed to othe r soc ial ill s, such as the needle-borne 
spread of AIDS). 
20 The affidavit of probable cause in the search warrant applica tion states: 
The undersigned affi ant is a member of the Narcot ics Uni t of the Metropolis Police 
Department and has been in vo lved in the in vest igatio n of drug and drug-re lated 
crime for the past three yea rs. On [date] a confidentia l informant told the affiant 
tha t cocaine is stored in the res idence of Charles and Linda Raft [address]. The 
informant has provided reliable information in the pas t. On three occasions, in-
formation provided by the informant resulted in the arrest of drug suspects or in 
the se izure of controlled substances . The confidential informant saw drugs in the 
Rafts' house two weeks ago . The Rafts sell the drug from their home to other 
persons. Based on th e informant's contacts and sources , he believes that the Rafts 
will have a large amount of cocaine in their hou se on thi s date, in preparation for 
a large sale tomorrow. 
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At 7:30p.m., ten heavily armed officers arrive to execute the 
warrant. They sledgehammer the front door and gain entry to the 
living room. To immobilize the occupants of the house, they order 
the Rafts and their twelve-year-old son to lie on the floor, guns 
trained at their heads ; they are warned that if they move they will 
be shot. Police fan out through the house searching for drugs. 
They do not find any cocaine, but in the process of the search 
they do discover a small amount of marijuana. During the search, 
th e police empty closets, overturn tab les , take apart household 
equipment and tool s and dismantle several pieces of furniture. 
Two of the officers direct racial epithet s at the family; M r. Raft is 
called a "black-ass drug dealer.' ' 
Frustrated by their lac k of success, the police take Mr. Raft 
into the basement and threaten him with arrest for possession of 
marijuana unless he supplies them with information about drug 
dealers in the neighborhood. Raft tells the police that he knows 
nothing about drug transactions, and that the marijuana is left over 
from a party they gave several months before . The police inform 
Raft that their informant had been in the house and had observed 
narcotics transactions; Raft again states that he has no information 
and that he does not deal in drugs. Raft does add that he had 
recently been involved in a dispute with a person in the neighbor-
hood who is known to be involved in drugs, Robert Castle. Raft 
asks the police if Castle was the informant, but the police decline 
to answer. 
Believing that Raft is lying about hi s involvement in drug 
activity, the police decide to arrest him for possession of mari-
juana, even though they know that the amount involved is below 
the level established by the District Attorney as a minimum thresh-
old for criminal charges. At the narcotics division , Raft is again 
questioned about drug activity; upon his denials , he is struck 
several times by one of the officers. He suffers injuries to the face 
and arms. He is then charged with assaulting a police officer and 
resisting arrest. 
At the preliminary hearing on the criminal charges , an assis-
tant district attorney offers to drop the criminal charges against 
Raft if he will agree to waive his right to sue the police. Raft agrees 
to these conditions, and the crimi nal charges are dismissed. 
T his version of Monroe v. Pape , updated to the 1990s, pro-
vides a point of departure for examining the key elements and 
472 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 27 
dynamics of police misconduct. 21 The next section analyzes the 
hypothetical in terms of the legal response , the institutional causes 
of the conduct and the culture of police abuse. In the concluding 
section of this Article, I explore a possible agenda for reform. 
III. Judicial and Admini strative Remedies for Police 
Misconduct: The Failure of the Courts and the Political Process 
As a matter of public policy and constitutional law, one would 
expect that the conduct of the police in our hypothetical would be 
subject to strong condemnation . indeed, a video portrayal of these 
events would probably inspire reactions similar to those generated 
by the Rodney King video. Yet, in the real world of civil rights 
litigation and po lice administration , we can expect to find just the 
opposite: a good deal of the misconduct will not be remediable in 
the courts and, as an internal administrative matter, little if any 
evaluative or disciplinary action would be taken against the offi-
cers. In fact, as we will see, their actions were a predictable result 
of police policies and legal doctrine that subordinate individual 
rights to police power. 
The hypothetical raises dis tinct issues of legal and administra-
tive process, as well as social policy. To elucidate these systemic 
problems, it is helpful to examine each aspect of the Metropolis 
police officers ' conduct. 
A. The Search Warrant 
The process by which the police obtained the warrant is highly 
problematic. The officers used an illegal arrest to put pressure on 
an informant, withheld this information from the judge who issued 
the warrant, and submitted an affidavit that arguably fell short of 
probable cause. In a civil suit, the warrant could be attacked for 
its failure to provide a sufficient factual basis for believing the 
informer's tip. 22 However, even if a reviewing court found there 
was no probable cause to justify the warrant, the doctrine of 
21 The facts in this hypothetical present events that occur on a far too regular basis. 
See HousE CoMM. ON THE JuDICIARY , REPORT ON THE OMNIBUS CRIME CoNTROL AcT 
oF 1991, H.R. REP. No. 242 , 102cl Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 135-39 (1991). 
22 See ll\inois v. Gates, 462 U. S . 213 , 239 (1983); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
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qualified immunity would preclude a damage award against the 
officer who secured it unles s no reasonably well -trained officer 
would have believed that probable cause existed .23 Th us, even if 
a constitutional vi olation could be proven , the officer would be 
protected from liability in damages. 24 
T he facts suggest that the informant acted out of a personal 
grudge against the Rafts and may have provided false info rmation . 
However, unless this fac t was known to the police, it would not 
provide an adequate basi s for challenging the warrant. 25 Indeed, 
the warrant could still be upheld even if the police deliberately 
withheld the fact that the y had illegally arrested Castle and pres-
sured him to talk. 26 Suing Castl e would not be a real option for 
the Rafts either, given the informant 's privilege and the difficulty 
of establishing the level of state action necessary to bring his 
conduct within the purview of Section 1983.27 
F inally, the Rafts could not assert a violation of their own 
Fourth Amendment rights based on Castle's unlawful pretext ar-
rest. Even if the police deliberately violated Castle's rights to 
~ 3 Mall ey v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 ( 1986) . In United States v. Leon, 468 U .S . 897 , 
922 n. 23 (1984), the Supreme Court adop ted the same standard for a "good-faith" exception 
to the exclusionary rule. Leon has been the subject of extensive di scu ss io n. See Abraham 
Goldste in , Th e Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review , 62 N .Y.U . L. REV. 
11 73 (!987); Craig Uc hida et al. , A cting in Good Faith: The Effects of United States v. 
Leon on the Police and Courts, 30 ARIZ. L. REv . 467 (1988); Donald Dripps, Living with 
Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986); S te ve n D. Duke, Ma kin g Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J . 1405 
(1 986). 
~4 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials from damage award s 
in civil rights cases where the ir conduct "does not violate clearly es tabli shed statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald , 457 U.S . 800 , 81 8 (1 982). For further discussion of thi s doctrine, see infra notes 35-
37 , 42-43 and accompanying text. 
25 Where an officer has a reasonable basis to cred it the assertions of an informant , th e 
fact that the informant knowingly provided fal se information is not a basis for a ttacking 
the warrant. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. !54 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Brad-
shaw, 434 A.2d 181 (Pa. Super. 1981). 
26 In Franks , 438 U.S. 154 , the Court rul ed that a search warrant will be deemed invalid 
for reason s of an affiant ' s mi srepresentat ions o nly where the false info rmatio n was given 
deliberate ly or in reckless di sregard of the truth , and where probable cause would not have 
existed without th at information . S ee also Leon , 468 U.S. at 923. 
27 On the informant' s privilege, see McCray v. Illinois , 386 U.S . 300 (1 967) (as a genera l 
rule, gove rnment need not reveal identity of info rmant at suppression hearing; disclosure 
only requ ired where defendant makes a subs tan tial showing th at informant may not exist 
or that affiant has deliberately missta ted information received). S ee also Franks, 438 U.S. 
at 167. In c ivi l suits , the courts ge nerall y have not found informants to be acting "under 
color of s tate law" and therefore no t subj ec t to suit under S 1983. Se e, e.g., Ghandi v. 
Police Dep' t of City of De tro it, 823 F.2d 959 (6th Ci r. 1987) . 
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enable them to obtain information to be used against the Rafts 
' the Rafts would lack standing to challenge such unconstitutional 
conduct. 28 
There is a direct link between the legal standards regarding 
the search warrant process and the tactics used by the Metropolis 
police. Warrants can issue on little more than hearsay allegations 
of informants, 2lJ and the Court has erected virtually insurmountable 
barriers to requiring further judicial inquiry into the informant's 
credibility, motives or even her very existence. 30 Thus, the police 
have been told that barring the most unusual circumstances there 
will be no inquiry into the truthfulness of what the informant 
alleged or the truthfulness of the officer's assertions. 
If Metropolis is true to contemporary police administration, 
it will have no standards for informant controJ.3 1 Each detective 
or officer is relatively free to develop her own network of infor-
mants, and there is little overall supervision of individual infor-
mants' credibility, reliability or usefulnessY Moreover, in cases 
where a court actually strikes down a warrant and suppresses 
evidence in a criminal case, or awards a plaintiff damages in a civil 
matter, the adjudication is not likely to be reported to the 
department. 33 
The police and prosecutor also know that under the "good 
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule, even if the warrant does 
not state probable cause, it will be upheld if a reasonable officer 
28 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Indeed, even where the police 
commit a criminal act to obtain information about a third-party suspect, the Supreme Court 
has denied the third party standing to challenge the illegality, ruling that the federal courts 
should not invoke their supervisory powers to exclude the evidence obtained. See United 
States v. Payncr, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). 
29 See, e.g. , Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); McCray, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
30 Absent extraordinary circumstances, the identity of the informant will not be dis-
closed. See Franks, 438 U.S. 154; J'V!cCray, 386 U.S. 300. See also Irving Younger, The 
Perjury Rouline, THE NATION, May 8, 1967 , at 596. 
31 The general practice among police departments is that informants are treated as the 
"property" of individual investigators; interactions between informants and investigators 
are most often informal and go undocumented. However, a more centralized and profes-
sionalized system has recently been proposed by groups such as the International Associ-
ation of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Policy Center. See INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY CENTER, MODEL 
POLICY: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS-CONCEPTS AND ISSUES PAPER (June 1990). These 
standards have yet to be adopted on a national scale. 
32 See Selwyn Raab, Chief Warns of Corruplion in Drug Unil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
1992, at B I (revelations that NYC narcotics investigators lied to strengthen cases and 
obtain arrest warrants demonstrates need for tighter internal controls and supervision). 
33 Response of Defendant City of Philadelphia to Interrogatories in Campbell v. City 
of Philadelphia, C.A. No. 91-4512 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (copy on file with author). 
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would have believed that it did , a standard that has sustained the 
most questionable of warrants . 34 The qualified immunity doctrine 
would then preclude recovery against the Metropolis officers 
where the conduct, th ough adjudged unconstitutional, had not 
been previously clearly proscribed. 35 The defense would be avail-
able even where the officers acted with malice or with an intent 
to violate the citizen's rights. 36 The policy considerations support-
ing some form of immunity- such as the desire to protect officials 
from suit where they were not reasonably on notice of the legal 
standards governing their conduct- cou ld be satisfied with a far 
narrower defense Y 
Whatever the theoretical and policy meri ts of qualified im-
munity , we must recogni ze that broader immunity creates greater 
incentives to cut constitut ional corners. Where more surveillance 
or investigation might be indicated prior to seeking a warrant, an 
officer could decide to forego thi s work, knowing that she only 
has to approximate probable cause. F urthermore, an officer might 
be tempted to fal sely assert than an informant has a strong record 
of reliability. Even worse, an officer could entirely fabricate an 
info rmant with minimal fear of negative repercus sions. In the 
Rafts ' case , there was a distinct possibility that the informant acted 
out of personal malice in providing the information, yet the officers 
had no incentive to examine hi s truthfulness. 
B. Execution of the Search Warrant 
Similar incentives to cut constitutional corners exist in exe-
cuting the warrant. The officers' entry into the Raft house appears 
to have been a violation of the Fourth Amendment, as there was 
no "knock and announce" before the police used a sledgehammer 
3' See United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) ; U ni ted States v. Bishop, 890 
F.2d 212 , 216-18 (lOth Cir. 1989) . 
35 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Harlow v. F itzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982). 
36 Harlow . 457 U.S. a t 815-19. 
n See Dav id Rud ovsky, Th e Qualified immunity Doctrine in th e Suprem e Court : 
Ju dicial Acrivism and tlz e Restriction of Conslitulional Righ ts, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23 
( 1989); Ri chard H. Fa ll on, Jr. & Daniel 1. Meltzer, Ne w L aw, Non-R etroactivity, and 
Const itutional Remedies, 104 H ARV. L. REv. 1731 , 1822- 23 (1 99 1). 
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to invade the premises. 3x Of course, the police might dispute 
whether or not there was any prior announcement of purpose, 
presenting a factual issue at trial. 
Moreover. it is possible that the officers would testify that 
they dispensed with the knock and announce procedure based on 
their belief that violence or destruction of the drugs would have 
resulted if they had identified themselves. While it seems to be 
settled law that an announcement of purpose is generally not for-
given in these circumstances, and that permission to dispense with 
these requirements must by granted by the judge who issues the 
warrant, 39 the police could still raise a qualified immunity defense 
to this claim. 40 
Several inst itutional factors also encourage police entry with-
out announcement. The Metropolis police know that if drugs are 
found during the search , their testimony that they did in fact knock 
and announce-or that some exigent circumstances justified their 
entry without identification-would almost always be credited. 
The police also know that if nothing is found, legal action will be 
highly unlikely, and therefore the illegality of their entry will be 
rendered purely academic. 
The manner in which the police searched the Raft house raises 
serious problems under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The occupants were terrorized; the police pointed guns at them 
and forced them to lie on the floor during the search. The destruc-
tion of personal property during the search may have constituted 
a Fourth Amendment violation. 41 The police would likely respond 
with a potent defense: in narcotics raids they often face violent 
opposition, and their tactic is to scare and immobilize the occu-
pants to prevent anyone from getting hurt. The destruction of 
3~ State and federal statutes typically require the police to knock and announce their 
purpose unless there a re exigent circumstances that justify immediate entry. See, e .g ., 
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 844 (West 1982) ; 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988). The Fourth Amendment 
also appears to require the " knock and announce ," absent exigent circumstances. See Ker 
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
39 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grubb, 595 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super. 1991); State v. Cleve-
land, 348 N.W.2d 512 , 519 (Wis. 1984). 
40 The issue under the qualified immunity doctrine would be whether it was clearly 
established that an unannounced entry based on the generalized exigencies inherent in a 
drug search must be rev iewed by the judge or magistrate reviewing the search warrant and 
not by the police officer. See, e .g ., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U .S. 511 (1985). 
4 1 See Tarpley v. Gree ne, 684 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[D]estruction of property 
that is not reasonabl y necessary to effectively execute a sea rch warrant may violate the 
Fourth Amendment."). 
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property would be justified by asserting that drugs are often hidden 
in these areas and that a close and intrusive search is permissible 
under the circumstances. 
While a good case could be made that the search techniques 
were excessive, it is not at all clear that the Rafts would prevai l 
as to all aspects of the search. Again , under the qualified immunity 
doctrine, there could be no recovery in damages against the offi-
cers unless the law was previou sly clearly established that the 
challenged conduct was unconsti tut ional. 42 Moreover, because a 
court can decide the immunity que stion without reaching the mer-
its of the issue, it is possible that no clearly established principles 
would ever be articulated in this area, thus leaving the police free 
to engage in similar conduct in the futureY 
It is unlikely that Metropolis police command officials would 
critically review these search practices. -1-l It is also unl ikely that 
the department would take remed ia l action. The failure to evaluate 
practices such as the "use of intimidation" during drug raids un-
dermines individual officer accountability by providing implicit 
departmental approval of these questionable practices. 
E ven if a court found the officers ' conduct to be unconstitu-
tional , supervising officials would rightly consider it unfair to dis-
cipline them since the officers involved were not responsible for 
the adoption of the search techniques employed at the Raft house. 
It would be appropriate for the department to reconsider its search 
policy at this point, but unless the courts seem inclined to suppress 
evidence or to assess damages, the department 's belief that these 
practices are essential to drug enforcement would almost certainly 
preempt any reform. 
Municipal liability would be a potential source for relief. Qual-
ified immunity would not be a defense here .45 However, under the 
remedial scheme of Section 1983 , municipalities are liable for un-
constitutional police conduct only where a municipal policy, law 
4
' See supra notes 24, 35-37 and accompan ying tex t. 
43 See Rudovsky, supra note 37. a t 53- 55. See also Borucki v. Ryan , 827 F. 2d 836 (1 st 
Cir. 1987); Ramirez v. Webb, 835 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1987); Walentas v. Lipper, 862 F .2d 
414 (2d Cir. 1988) , cert. denied , 490 U.S. 1021 (1989) . 
44 Even if the unit command had re viewed plans for the search, since no command 
officials we re present during its execut ion. rev ie w wou ld be unlikely unless the Rafts 
initiated court proceedings . T he average met ropolit an police de partment has no dev ice in 
place to evalua te the pe rformance of spec ific officers and teams . See Raab, supra note 32. 
45 See Owen v. City of Indepe ndence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
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or custom demonstrably caused it. 46 Because these search prac-
tices are unlikely to be "official" departmental policy, the Rafts 
would have the heavy burden of demonstrating a pattern of such 
excessive searches sufficient to prove a settled practice or cus-
tomY The fa ilure of the department to train or properly supervise 
its officers in this area is a basis for li ability, but only where the 
plaintiff can show that policy makers were "deliberate ly indiffer-
ent" to the rights of the public. 48 
Given the problematic nature of a remedy in damages, the 
Rafts would probably seek equitable relief. But the Supreme Court 
has imposed su bstantial obstacles to such an action. In City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons ,-~ 9 the Court refused to grant injunctive relief to 
a plaintiff who had suffered permanent physical injuries when a 
police officer administered a '·'chokehold" in effecting an arrest. 
Relief was denied even though the record demonstrated that this 
police practice was commonly used in circumstances not justifying 
such force and had resulted in sixteen deaths in recent years. 50 
The Court determined that the past injury had no continuing effects 
sufficient to provide standi ng for prospective relief and that the 
plaintiff was unable to show that he, as opposed to any other 
citizen, would again be subject to the same unconstitu tional con-
duct. 51 The Court has been disinclined to enjoin most local police 
procedures ,52 and it is highly unlikely that the Rafts would be 
granted equitable relief. 
46 In Monell v. New York Dep 't of Social S ervs. , 436 U.S. 658 (1978) , the Court ruled 
that a municipality was liab le under & 1983 only where " the action that is a lleged to be 
unconstitutional implement s or execute" a policy statement, ordina nce, regulat ion, or de-
cision officially adopted and promulgated by [the municipality]." !d. at 690-91. The Monell 
doctrine has been further refined in more recent case law. See, e.g., City of Canton v. 
Harri s, 489 U.S. 378, 388- 89 (1989) (holding that unsatisfactory training of police officers 
constitutes insufficient grounds for holding city liable unless city exhibited deliberate in-
difference); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 122 (1988) (stating that a 
municipality is li able onl y if the challenged action was pursuant to official policy); Pembaur 
v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469 , 483-84 (1986) (recovery from a municipality can be 
based upon acts sanctioned by officials responsible for establishing municipal policy). 
47 See cases cited supra note 46. See also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 
808, 820-22 (1985) ; Languirand v. Hayden , 717 F.2d 220, 227-30 (5th Cir. 1983). 
4~ City of Canton , 489 U.S. at 389. For applicat ion of this standard in the lower federal 
courts, see , e.g., Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1481-82 (9th Cir. 199 1); Gentile 
v. County of Suffolk , 926 F.2J 142 , 152-53 (2d Cir. 1991); Kerr v. City of'vVest Palm Beach, 
875 F.2d 1546, 1555-57 (lith Cir. 1989). 
49 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
50 ld. at 100 , 110-13 . 
" !d. at 101 -05 . 
5 ~ See , e.g., Rizzo v. Goode. 423 U.S . 362 (1976). 
1992] Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained? 479 
C. Pretextual Arrests 
The Metropolis police executed two pretextual arrests to ac-
complish their goals. They arrested Castle without probable cause; 
then they arrested Mr. Raft on charges for which they knew he 
would not be prosecuted. But Castle's arrest, regardless of its 
illegality, would not provide the Rafts with a constitutional claim. 53 
Mr. Raft's own arrest fo r drug possession was constitutionally 
permissible since it was supported by objective probable cause. 54 
Accordingly, unless the police department restricts the power of 
its officers to make pretex t arrests or searches , this conduct is 
likely to be repeated. 
The Raft case demons tra te s how the Court's jurisprudence on 
pretext arrests provides incent ives to the po lice to violate or avoid 
basic constitutional guarantees. The police knew in advance that 
their illegal arrest of Castl e would be a moot legal issue in any 
resulting investigation or arrest of the Rafts. Castle was unlikely 
to complain since he was the beneficiary of a deal to drop all 
charges against him. Raft's arrest on drug charges would never 
have been made in the normal course of events, but the police 
used it in this case to gain leverage against Raft. This leverage 
was used both in the investigation and later to obtain the release 
of the officers from civil liability in exchange for the dismissal of 
the criminal charges. Surely, if deterring police misconduct is a 
principal purpose of the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine, the 
pretextual arrests made in Metropolis should be classic candidates 
for strong remedial action. 
53 See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) ; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
5-' Most federal courts ha ve ruled that whe re a reasonable police officer could have 
taken the act ion in question cons istent with the Fourth Amendment, the fact that she did 
it for improper purposes is irre levant. See, e.g., United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 , 
1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 213-15 (3d Cir. 
1987). Other courts have ruled that where no reasonable officer would have made the 
pretextual stop, even though technically a llowed under the Fourth Amendment, the evi-
dence should be suppressed. See . e .g. , Un ited States v. Guzman , 864 F.2d 1512, 1515-18 
(lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. Sm ith. 799 F.2d 704, 708 (lith Cir. 1986). The Supreme 
Court recently denied certiorari , over Justice White's dissent, in three cases that presented 
thi s is sue: Cummins v. United States, 90-1628, 60 U.S.L.W. 3358 (Nov. 12, 1991); Trigg v. 
United States, 91-5013, 60 U.S.LW. 3358 (Nov. 12 , 1991) ; Enriquez-Nevarez v. United 
States , 91-5087, 60 U.S.L.W. 3358 (Nov . 12. 1991 ). 
See generally DanielS. Jonas. Pre1e.r1 Searches and !he Four!h Amendment: Uncon-
slitutiona/ Abuses of Poll ·er , 137 U. PA. L REv . 1791 ( 1989); John M. Burkoff, The Pre /ext 
Search Doctrine R eturns After Nn·e r Leaving, 66 U. DET. L. REv. 363 (1989). 
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There is substantial evidence that police are quite sophi sti-
cated in exploiting the many loopholes created by the Court's 
constitutional remedies juri sprudence. For example, in Cooper v. 
Dupnik, 55 the police deliberately refu sed to honor the suspect's 
request for counsel during intenogation. The police knew that any 
statement given by the defendant would be suppressed at tria l, but 
they also knew that the Supreme Court had ruled that such state-
ments could be used to impeach the defendant if he te stified at 
tria l. 56 The defendant was in fac t innocent and was exonerated of 
ail charges . In an ensuing lawsuit under Section 1983 , the police 
admitted that they had hoped the ir illegal questioning would resu lt 
in a state ment that would deter the defendant from testifying. The 
court nonethe less ruled that M iranda is not a constitutionall y man-
dated rule , and that the plaintiff was not harmed by lack of counsel 
since no fruits of the quest ioning we re introduced against him . 57 
Cooper reveal s a troubling judicial complacency and rigid ity in the 
fac e of a police practice that consciously manipulated and ignored 
basic constitutional guarantees. If the courts do not address delib-
erate misconduct , it is unreali stic to believe that other institutions 
will respond. 
In a world where most police officers and administrators con-
tinue to believe that ends justify means, few departments will 
forego pretextual police practices in the absence of judicial pres-
sures to reform. T his is particularly true of a narcotics unit oper-
ating under few, if any, meaningful constraints with respect to 
policies involving informants and undercover activity. 
D . Excessive Force 
The Metropolis officers' conduct back at the Narcotics Divi-
sion probably violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 58 
55 924 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1991 ), reh'g gran!ed en bane, 933 F.2d 798 (1991). 
;6 S ee Harris v. New York , 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
57 Cooper, 924 F.2d a t 1528. 
ss In Graham \'. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 ( 1989), the Court rul ed that the use of excess ive 
forc e by the police during an arrest or othe r seizure of a person vio lates the reasonableness 
standard of the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the state's asserti o n th at such 
cla ims should be dec ided under a substantive due process test. Two issues have been 
contes ted in the wa ke of Graham. T he first is the iss ue of what s tandard appli es after the 
suspect has been a rres ted and ta ke n to the po li ce di s trict. The Court has rul ed that the 
Eighth Amendmen t app lie s to pos t-conv ic tion cla ims of excess ive force. S ee Hudson v. 
McMilli an, 112 S . Ct . 995 (1992) (use of excessive physical force against a pri so ner may 
viol ate Eighth Ame ndment alth ough no seriou s injury resulted); Whitley v. Albers, 475 
1992] Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained ? 481 
Raft would argue that the police used excessive force by striking 
him while they were questioning him, and that his arrest for the 
false cover charges constituted malicious prosecution and false 
impriso nment. 59 H owever, proving the se allegations would not be 
easy. T he police would undoubtedly testify that Raft became un-
ruly and assaulted an officer, and that reasonable force was used 
to subdue him. Because of the police code of silence ,60 the officers 
who witnessed the assau lt would testify ei the r that they did not 
observe the incident or. if they did, that the police acted properly 
in self-defense . The incident, unlike the Rodney King beating , 
wou ld not have been videotaped. 
Excessive force is a product of a po lice culture that rational-
izes physical abuse as appropriate pun ishment for persons who 
are viewed as troub le-makers or deviants. Studies of excessive 
use of force point out th at a predictab le cata lyst to abu se is the 
officers' perceptio n th at their auth ority is being questioned or 
defied. 61 E ven verbal questioning of authority leads many police 
officers to believe that their power and position have been threat-
U.S. 312 (1986) . The lo wer fed e ral courts have cl iviclccl on the qu estion of how to evaluate 
claims by persons held between anest and dete ntion. See Wilkins v . May, 872 F.2cl 190 , 
192-93 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. den ied. 493 U.S . 1026 ( 1990) (app lying substantive due process 
tes t); Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2cl 145, 147 (7th C ir. 1990) (applying clue process standard 
wh ich court describes as s imilar to the Fourth Amendment test); Austin v. Hamilton , 945 
F.2d 11 55 (lOth Cir. 1991) (applying Fourth Amendme nt tes t). 
The second question that has ari se n is whether th e plaintiff must demonstrate a certain 
level of injury to establi s h an excess ive force cl ai m. Compare John son v. Morel , 876 F.2d 
477, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curi a m) ll'ith Gra y v. Spi llma n, 925 F.2d 90, 93-94 (4th Cir. 
199 1) . The Court' s recent ruling in Hudson . 11 2 S. Ct. 995, makes clear that the nature of 
the ph ys ical injury s uffered is not a controlling fac tor for Eighth Amendme nt purposes. 
59 A police defe ndant accu sed o f using excess ive fo rce should not be able to prevail 
using the qu alified immunit y doc trin e. Assuming th e usc of force was unju s tified , the 
defenda nt ca nnot claim that a reasonabl e offi ce r would have believed his act ions to be 
lawful s impl y beca use it was no t clear to him what legal s ta ndard applied. See Dixon v. 
Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460-62 ( I Oth Cir. 199 1) (rejec ting qualified immunity de fense 
because legal s tand ard for unreasonable force during seizure was clearly establi shed at time 
of incident). 
w The "police code of silence" is an unwritten rule and custom th at police will not 
testify against a fe llow officer a nd that police a re ex pected to hel p in any cover-up of illegal 
ac tions. The code of sile nce has been recognized and doc umented in litigation a nd s tudies 
of police culture. See, e.g. , Bran don v. Holt. 469 U. S . 464 , 467 n .6 (1985) (q uoting Bra ndon 
v. Allen, 516 F. Supp . 1355 , 136 1 (W.O. Te nn. 1981)); Bonsignore v. Ci ty of New York , 
52 ! F. Supp . 394 , 398-99 (S.O.N.Y. 1981 ), aff'd , 683 F. 2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982) ; A LB ERT J. 
RE ISS, THE POLICE AND THE P UBLI C 2 13- 14 (197 1) ; J EROME H. SKOLN ICK , JUSTI CE WITH-
OUT TRIA L: LAW ENFORCE MENT IN DEMOCRATIC SoCIETY 58, 249 (2d ed. 1975). The code 
of s ilence is di scussed in greater detai l below. See infra notes 83- 89 and accompa nyin g 
tex t. 
6 1 S ec PAU L C HEYI GN Y, PoLICE Pow ER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEw YoRK 51 - 83 (1969); 
SKOLN ICK, supra no te 60 . 
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ened. In these situation s, the police will demand immediate com-
pliance and acquiescence. If obedience is not forthcoming, the 
incident escalates and an arrest and use of force is likely to 
follow. 62 
Physical abuse is a constant threat and will occur most fre-
quently in departments that do not take this conduct seriously. 63 
The potential for illegal use of force is so great that the experienced 
ad ministrator knows that without a meaningful system of accoun t-
abi lity , officers wi ll act illega lly more frequently. Even those o ffi -
cers who normally would not use illegal force will be more likely 
to do so if they know it w ill be tolerated. 64 
The Rodney King incident is a paradigmatic event demonstrat-
ing the serious consequences of the failure to impose accountabil-
ity. Rodney King underwent a beating that was both protracted 
and public. The officers involved had to be fully confident of th eir 
colleagues ' si lence and of their department's dismissal of any com-
plaints made by the numerous witnesses to this incident. Indeed, 
so sure were these officers of their immunity from punishment that 
they bragged about their abuses on the official police computer 
sys tem and to medical personnel at the hospital where King was 
belatedly taken for treatment. Only officers assured by prior ex -
perience and knowledge of departmental attitudes that the depart-
ment would not investigate or punish this type of abuse (regardless 
of the credibility of the witnesses or of their own incriminating 
statements) could have rationally taken the risk of engaging in this 
type of behavior. 65 
" 2 See CHEVIGNY , supra note 61, at 51-83, 88-98. 
63 LAIC, supra note 6, at 15 1-79; Recommendations of the Task Force on the Use of 
Force by the Kan sas Cit y, Missouri Police Department 45-49 (January 1991) (on file with 
the au thor) [hereinafter Kansas City Task Force]; Report of the Boston Police Department 
Management Re view Committee 99- 136 (January 1992) (on file with the H arvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review) [hereinafter Boston Police Report]. 
64 See supra notes 61 and 63. See also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 10. 
65 The LAIC described the radio transmissions as follows: 
Computer and radio messages transmitted among officers immediately after 
the beating raised add itiona l concerns that the King beating was part of a larger 
pattern of police abuse. Shortly before the King beating, Powell's and Wind's 
patrol unit transmitted the computer message th at an earlier domestic dispute 
between an African-American couple was "right out of 'Gorillas in the Mist"', a 
reference to a motion picture about the study of gori ll as in Africa. 
The initi a l report of the bea ting came at 12:56 a.m., when Koon's unit reported 
to the Watc h Com mander' s desk a t Foothill Station , " You just had a big time use 
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Examples from adjudicated cases and from independent in-
vestigations provide hard documentation of the systemic flaws in 
the complaint processes in many police departments. 66 It is not 
uncommon to find that officers who have been the subject of 
numerous citizen complaints of brutality are rarely disciplined and 
continue to serve on the forceY In Los Angeles , for example, the 
Independent Commission investigating the Rodney King incident 
determined that several officers who had been foun d responsible 
for the illegal use of force on civilians had at the same time received 
performance reviews that made no mention of these findings and 
which praised the officers' attitude toward civ il ians. 68 
of force ... rased and beat the suspect of CH P pursuit. Big Time." The station 
responded at 12:57 a.m .. ··oh well ... I'm sure the lizard didn't deserve it .... " 
.... In response to a request from the scene for assistance for a "victim of 
a beating." the LAPD dispatcher called the Los Angeles Fire Department for a 
rescue ambulance: 
P.O.: ... Foothill & Osborne. In the valley dude (Fire Department dispatcher 
laughs) and like he got beat up. 
F.D.: (laugh) wait (laugh). 
P.O.: We are on scene. 
F.D.: Hold, hold on, give me the address again. 
P.O.: Foothill & Osborne , he pissed us off, so I guess he needs an ambulance 
now. 
F.D.: Oh, Osborne. Little attitude adjustment'7 
P.O.: Yeah, we had to chase him. 
F.D.: OH! 
P.D.: CHP and us, I think that kind of irritated us a little. 
F.D.: Why would you want to do that for? 
P.D.: (laughter) should know better than run. they are going to pay a price when 
they do that. 
F. D.: What type of incident would you say this is? 
P.D.: It's a ... it's a ... battery, he got beat up. 
At Pacifica Hospital, where King was taken for initial treatment, nurses 
reported the officers who accompanied King (who included Wind) openly joked 
and bragged about the number of times King had been hit. 
LAIC, supra note 6, at 14-15. See also PaulL. Hoffman, Legal Director, ACLU Foundation 
of Southern California, Prepared Remarks Submitted to the House Subcommmittee on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Mar. 20, 1991, 3-6 (on 
file with the author) [hereinafter Hoffman]. 
66 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562-66 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391-95 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027 
(1988); Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2cl 499, 508 (8th Cir. 1987). For commentary on 
this issue, see LAIC, supra note 6, at 151-79; Kansas City Task Force, supra note 63, at 
45-49; Boston Police Report , supra note 63 , at 99-119 (The Boston Police Department, 
rather than responding to citizen complaints of abuse , "tries to outlast the [complaining] 
victim, to continue it and continue it until the victim gets fed up and no longer comes to 
the hearings.''). 
" 7 See LAIC, supra note 6, at 37-48; Kansas City Task Force. supra note 63, at 45-
46; Boston Police Report. supra note 63. at 113-14. 
68 LAIC, supra note 6, at 137-48. 
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It is quite likely that our hypothetical Metropolis has similar 
infirmities in its review and adjudication of civilian complaints. 
Not so hypothetically, assume that a study of the civilian com-
plaints lodged against members of the Metropolis police depart-
ment discloses that for a two-year period preceding this incident 
"a total of 756 individual officers were named as subjects of civilian 
complaints .... The names of 29 officers appeared collectively 
303 times, each being named nine or more times .... "69 If the 
officer who assaulted Raft was one of the officers with mne or 
more complaints, his conduct on this occasion should not be 
surpns1ng. 
The department's fa ilure to investigate allegations of abuse, 
or to impose appropriate punishment , would lead the reasonable 
police officer to assume that even repeated violations of citizens' 
rights would be condoned within the department. 70 The failure to 
hold these officers accountable for their prior misconduct is a 
direct link to the abuse of Raft. The deleterious consequences of 
the department's failure to monitor and discipline these officers 
run far wider than the encouragement it might give them to con-
tinue to abuse civilians. The message that violence and abusive 
conduct will be ignored is also sent to every other officer on the 
force. 71 
For its part, the Supreme Court either does not grasp the 
institutional causes of abuse or, as a matter of ideology, is using 
the doctrines of federalism and judicial restraint to allow these 
conditions to persist. There is a striking disjunction between the 
widely recognized causes of abuse and the Court's response. The 
Supreme Court's rulings reflect a belief that abuse occurs in iso-
lated instances and is caused by an occasional aberrant abusive 
officer. Faced with records that reflect institutional causes, the 
Court recoils at the argument that the Constitution requires inter-
vention on that level. 
In several key cases the Court has deliberately passed up the 
opportunity to craft an approach that would take into account 
systemic patterns of abuse. In Rizzo v. Goode,72 a federal district 
69 Kan sas City Task Force. supra note 63 , at 45. 
70 LAIC, supra note 6, at 153-79. See also Boston Police Report , supra note 63, at 
113-20. 
71 See LAIC , supra note 6, at 153-79 ; Boston Police Report , supra, note 63, at 113-
20 ; Kansas City Task Force, supra note 63, at 45-49. 
72 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E .D. Pa . 1973), rev 'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
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court had ruled that there was a pattern of police abuse in Phila-
delphia. In re sponse, the court ordered the implementation of an 
internal police department mechanism for the review and adjudi-
cation of civilian complaints against officers. The district court 
made the fairly obvious and well-supported finding that the fa ilure 
of the police department to invest igate these complaints and to 
discipline officers led to the high level of abuse. The district court 's 
order was focus ed and limited. It did not, for example, create a 
civilian review or oversight board. 73 
The Supreme Court reversed, stati ng th at principles of fed-
eralism and comity prohibited this kind of relief as an impermis-
sible intervention in the affai rs of local government. 74 As a matter 
of local governmental policy and poli ce admi ni stration , the fact 
that the nation's fourth larges t c ity (one with a well-earned repu-
tation for poli ce abuse) did not have a functioning internal review 
system is a cause for serious concern. T he refusal of the Supreme 
Court to permit such a remedy demonstrates a studied ignorance 
of the political and social realities of police misconduct. In ad-
dressing the tension between the protection of constitutional rights 
and local governmental prerogatives, the Co urt adopted a judicial 
calculus that reinforces the systemic aspects of police abuse by 
abdicating any judicial responsibility for the proven structural 
causes of misconduct. 
The Court followed a similar doctrinal approach in City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons ,15 in which it refu sed to enjoin the Los 
Angeles Police Department's use of the deadly "chokehold." The 
Court found, inter alia, that the improper and illegal application 
of the chokehold was not a routine City policy, and therefore had 
been unauthorized. 76 Equitable relief was justified only if " the City 
ordered or authorized police officers to act [illegally]. "77 
73 423 U. S. at 366-70. 
74 !d. at 377- 78. 
75 46 1 U. S. 95 (1983). See also supra notes 49-51 and ac companying text. 
76 Lyons, 46 1 U.S . at 107-08. 
77 !d. at 106. Lyons has been the subj ec t of seve re critici sm. See , e .g ., David Cole, 
Obtaining Standing to Seek Equitable Relief' Taming Lyons, in CIV IL RI GHTS LITIGATION 
AND ATTORNEY fE ES ANNUAL HANDBOOK 101 , 102 (J. L obel ed. , 1980) (arguing that 
Lyons should be cons trued narrowly to limit it s potentially illegitimate reach); Richa rd H. 
Fallo n , Jr., Of Ju sticiability, Remedies. and Public Law Litigation: No tes on the Jurispru-
dence of Lyons , 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. I ( 1984) (a rgu ing that the Court 's use of th e doctrines 
of s tanding and equitab le restraint to res trict pu blic law litigatio n is flawed ). The doc trina l 
fl aws di sc ussed in these a rti c les are no t the o nl y proble ms w ith Lyons; the opinio n reflects 
a startlin g lack of se nsitivit y to the fat a l con sequ enc es of the po lice practi ce. 
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The formalism of Lyons is disturbing both as a matter of 
constitutional adj udication and as a matter of social policy. Lyons 
sent a ch illing message to the Los Angeles Police Department: as 
long as abuses like the chokehold do not become city "policy," 
the Court would not interfere. It should come as no surprise that 
the Rodney King incident occurred in Los Angeles. There is a 
direct line from Lyons to Rodney King, and the Supreme Court 
bears some responsibility for the pattern of brutality in the Los 
Angeles Police Department that claimed King as one of its victims. 
In a more recent case, the Court did finally understand the 
link between internal police policies and abuse. In City of Canton 
v. H arris,IR the Court ruled that in some circumstances the failure 
of a police department to properly train or discipline its officers 
may give rise to municipal liability under Section 1983. 79 The 
causal connection between training and discipl ine and the inci-
dence of abuse are well established and the Court's ruling should 
prompt further moves toward increased accountability. In this 
regard, City of· Canton represents a short step towards correcting 
the ostrich-like approach in Rizzo v. Goode. 80 It is only a short 
step, however, because the Court limited the potential reach of its 
decision by insisting that the failure to train or discipline be the 
result of "deliberate indifference" of city officials. This is a level 
of culpability that approaches intentionality and that poses signif-
icant problems of proof. 81 The decision is further limited by the 
fact that the remedy for the failure to train is simply to extract 
damages from the municipality. This is significant in ensuring com-
pensation for the victim, but unless the damages are substantial, 
they will probably have little or no affect on policymakers . 
Whether the judgment will be considered a cost of doing business 
or will operate as an incentive to reform is an open question in 
most jurisdictions. 82 
Investigation and adjudicc.tion of claims of excessive force (as 
well as other forms of police abuse) are often frustrated by the 
78 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
7
" !d. at 388. 
80 See discussion supra at notes 72-74 and accompanying text. 
81 City ofCwzton , 489 U.S. at 388-92. Decisions in the lower federal courts demonstrate 
the difficulties involved in satisfying this burden of proof. See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper 
Darby Township. 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991); Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
82 See LAIC, supra note 6, at 55-61. See also SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 10. 
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police "code of silence. "~3 In our hypothetical , several officers 
witnessed the attack on Mr. Raft. It is a virtual certainty that none 
of these officers would provide any evidence in an internal pro-
ceed ing or court case against the offending officers. A former 
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
in recommending leniency for a police officer who testified in a 
police corruption trial , stated: 
[T]here is a custom that has deve loped within the Phila-
delphia Police Department that Philadelphia police offi-
cers will acquiesce in the illegal and improper conduct of 
their fellow officers and that when calied to tell the truth, 
as is the duty of every other citizen in this nation when 
call ed before a grand jury or questioned by lawful au-
thorities, that the Philadelphia police officer will remain 
si lent. s-1 
The code of sil ence does more than prevent testimony. It 
mand ates that no officer report another for misconduct, that su-
pervisors not discipline officers for abuse , that wrongdoing be 
covered up, and that any investigation or legal action into police 
misconduct be deflected and discouraged. 85 In Boston, for exam-
ple , experienced investigators will not volunteer for the Internal 
Affairs Division unless they are promised the ability to choose 
their next assignment "because they fear retribution once they [go 
back on the street]. "86 Officers shun temporary promotions to 
"acting sergeant," despite higher pay and prestige, because they 
do not want to have to be in the position of disciplining a fellow 
officer when they "might be back riding with that officer sometime 
in the future." 87 
~3 The "code of silence" has been openl y recognized by law enforcement officials. See, 
e.g., Selwyn Raab, Five Police Officers /ndicied by lurv in Torlure Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 1985, a t A l (Police Commissioner urges prison sentences for police officers to help 
shatter " the blue wall of silence"); Athel ia Knight & Be nj am in Weiser, D.C. Police Chief 
Prais es Officer Who Broke Police Code of Silence, WASH. PosT, Dec. 16, 1983, at Bl; 
LAIC , supra note 6, at 168-7 1; Bos ton Police Report, supra note 63, a t 59, 116, 124. See 
also supra note 60. 
84 Tim Weiner, Ex-Officer Who Broke Code of Silence Given Probation, PHILA . IN-
QUIRER , Feb. 13 , 1985, at I (Stateme nt of U.S. Attorney EdwardS. G. Dennis, Jr.). 
Rs See supra notes 60 , 83. 
86 Boston Police Report , supra note 63, a t 124. 
~7 !d. a t 59 . 
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Other participants in the criminal justice system abet this 
policy: prosecutors are highly reluctant to indict police for their 
illegal acts, judges rarely disbe lieve even incredible police testi-
mony, and allegations of police abuse often lead to more severe 
treatment of the accuser. 88 
There are ways in which the pernicious effects of the code of 
silence can be mitigated . Firs t, the department must make clear 
that officers who fai l to report and provide information regarding 
unlawful actions of fellow officers will be subject to se ri ous dis-
cipline . To be effecti ve, these sanctions shou ld be directed at 
supervisory offi cials who abet the code by uncritical acceptance 
of re ports that de monstrate a pattern of silence . Particular atten-
tion shou ld be paid to cases in which the allegations of the com-
plainant are sustained either in internal proceedings or in court , 
and where officers who observed the incident have either not come 
forward or have supported the false testimony of the offending 
officer. 
Second , th e co urts should recognize liability both fo r officers 
who fail to file truthful police reports or who remain silent con-
cerning abuses that they have witnessed and for municipalities on 
a theory that a department's failure to take steps to deal with the 
code of silence constitutes a municipal policy under Monell. 89 
E . Racially Motivated Conduct 
The use of racially derogatory language towards the Rafts is 
strong evidence that at leas t some of the officers' misconduct was 
racially motivated. Such conduct is ac tionable under Section 1983 
(and other civ il rights acts), 90 although once again the burden of 
proof is significant. No independent witnesses could confirm the 
remarks; the police would maintain that they were firm but polite 
during the search of the house; and most jurors would be disinc-
lined to believe that the police acted out of racial motivation. 91 
H6 Anthony G . Ams terdam , The S11preme Co 11rt and Th e Rig hts of Susp ec ts in Crimin a l 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 787- 89 (1970). 
BY See s11pru note 46. 
90 S ee, e.g., Johnson v. More l, 876 F.2d 477 , 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (en bane). Racially 
mot ivated police mi sconduct is a lso ac tio nable under 42 U.S. C. §§ 1981 and 1982. 
91 Of course, if the po li ce a re as openly rac ist as th ey we re in Los Ange les in the 
Rodney King inciden t. pol ice rad io tra nsmiss io ns o r o ther re corded statements may provide 
add itional proof of racially moti va ted abuse. 
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T he rac ism reflected in the derogatory remarks made to the 
Raft family is a legacy of our Nation's history of racial discrimi-
nation. Racially motivated conduct is hurtfu l in any form , but 
where it infects police practices the ri sks to the victim are partic-
ularly great. H istorically, police abuse against minorities has been 
the single most cited cause for the deep di strust and suspicion that 
inhere in virtually all police-minori ty community contacts and that 
have led on several occas ions to rebellions and riots. 92 
Even today, police tactics that wo uld not be countenanced in 
middle-class suburban communiti es are the norm in poorer urban 
areas where minorities make up the majority of the residents. It 
is not uncommon for the police to conduct sweeps of certain 
neighborhoods, to stop or arrest persons without individual sus-
picion , and to conduct searches like the one conducted a t the Raft 
home .93 The LAIC's report of viru lent racism in the Los Angeles 
Police Department should give pause to those who believe that we 
have eliminated overt rac ial prejudice from the criminal justice 
system.94 The police justify thei r differential treatment of minority 
communities by exploiting the universally shared fear of crime. 
But people whose lives a re threatened daily by criminal activity 
should not be subjected to poli ce abuse as a price of police 
protection. 
As long as rac ial discrimination exists in our culture , it will 
necessarily impact the criminal justice system. 95 However, we 
92 See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVI SORY COMMI SS ION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 157-68 
(Go vernment Printing Office 1968) [he reinaft er KERN ER COMMISSION REPORT]. 
93 See , e .g., C ity of Los Ange les v. L yo ns, 461 U.S. 95 (1 983) ; Hall v. Ochs , 817 F.2d 
920 (J st Cir. 1987); Spring Gard e n Un ited Ne ighbors v. C ity of P hil adelphia, 6 14 F. Supp . 
1350 (E .D. Pa . 1985); She ri Lynn Johnson , Race and the Decision to Detain A Suspect , 
93 YALE LJ . 214 , 225-37 ( 1983). 
9" The LA IC re viewed police tra ns miss ions a nd fo und "an appreciable number of ... 
racia l remarks," including 
" Well .. . I'm back ove r he re in the projec ts, piss ing off th e nat ives." 
" I would love to drive clown S la uson wit h a fl ame thro wer ... we wo uld have a 
barbeque. " 
" Sounds like monkey-s lapping time." 
"Oh always dear .. . w hat 's happe ning .. . we're huntin wabb its." 
"Actually , muslim wabbits ." 
" Just over he re on thi s arson/ho micide ... be ca reful one of those rabbits don ' t 
bit you." 
" Yea h f know . .. . Huntin wabb its is dange ro us.'' 
LAIC. supra note 6, at 72. 
95 See McCleskey v. Kemp. 41l l U.S . 279,286-87 ( 1987) (di sc uss ing rac ia l bias in death 
pena lt y prosec uti o ns in Geo rgia): MAUER, supra no te II , at !0; MAUE R 1992 UPDATE , 
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have the capacity to reduce the incidence of racially motivated 
misconduct. First, police departments must impose serious disci-
plinary sanctions for racist conduct. Second, departments must 
continue to integrate their forces both racially and sexually. Third, 
significant changes must be made in the training of officers with a 
view toward broadening their respect for persons of different 
races, sexual orientations, national origins and cultures. 96 Finally, 
police departments must address their failure to assure minorities 
quality assignments and equal opportunities for promotions. 97 It is 
remarkable that all of the officers involved in the Rodney King 
beating were white. While no one would suggest that minority 
officers do not commit abuses , their presence would assuredly 
provide some deterrence to overt racism. 
F. Institutional Obstacles 
There are other significant barriers to judicial vindication of 
the rights of victims of police misconduct. First, victims are not 
assured access to counsel. There is probably a very small civil 
rights bar in Metropolis; most lawyers would not be interested in 
a contingent fee case against the police or the city, even with the 
possibility of court-awarded attorney's fees if the suit is success-
fuJ.98 Second, many civil rights plaintiffs are burdened by charac-
teristics that may prejudice juries against them. They are often 
poor, or members of racial minorities , or uneducated or inarticu-
late; some have criminal records. Jurors tend to dismiss their 
allegations, often awarding them less than a full measure of 
compensation .99 
Third, release agreements can be insidious obstacles to the 
vindication of civil rights in police abuse cases: if they are validated 
by the courts , they will add to the arsenal of those interested in 
supra note 16, at 11-12. The drug war has had a highly disproportionate effect on racial 
minorities, particularly Blacks and Latinos. Se e, e. g ., Lisa Belkin, Airport Drug Efforts 
Snaring lnnocenls Wh o Fit 'Profiles ', N.Y. TIMES , Ma r. 20 , 1990, at AI; E.J . Mitchell , Jr., 
Has Drug War Become a War A gainst Blacks?, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 26, 1990, at AI; 
Rose Marie Arce, Crim es , Dmgs and Stereotypes , NEWSDAY , Dec. 2, 1991, at 5; Minnesota 
v. Russell, 60 U.S.L.W. 2425 (Dec. 13, 1991). 
96 See, e .g., LAIC, supra note 6, at 91-92, 136. 
97 See , e .g . , KERNER CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 92, at 166; LAIC , supra note 
6, at 78-91. 
9~ See Amste rdam , supra note 88 , a t 787 ; Caleb Foote , Tort Remedies for Police 
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 500 (1955). 
9'! Foote , supra note 98 , a t 500-08. 
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covering up police misconduct. In the Metropolis hypotheti cal, 
Raft agreed not to sue the po lice or the city in return for the 
dismissal of the criminal charges against him. There is a distinct 
possibility that this agreement would bar Raft's claims. In Town 
of Newton v. Rumery, 100 the Supreme Court ruled that a release 
agreement is valid if it is "the product of an informed and voluntary 
decision, " 101 and if "enforcement of [the] agreement would not 
adve rse ly affect the relevant pu blic interests." 102 Where a prose-
cutor played a role in the release negotiations , he must have "an 
independent and legit imate reason to make this agreement directl y 
r lated to hi s prosecutorial responsibi lit ies. " 103 T he burden of "es-
tablish[ing] that the agreement was neither involuntary nor the 
orod uct of an abuse of criminal orocess" rests uoon civil defen-, ' ' 
dants . 104 If the prosecutor ' s motivati on was simply to protect the 
police from a civil damages ac ti on, th e public policy prong of 
Rumery would probably be viol a.ted. 105 
Fourth , it is very possi ble th at the individual officers would 
be judgment proof. 106 If they a re, and if there is no provision for 
\ (XI 480 U .S. 386 (1987). 
10 1 !d. at 393. 
10 2 !d. at 398. 
103 !d. 
IO-I !d. at 399 (O 'Connor, J. , concurring in part and concurring in the judgment of the 
plurality). 
105 See id. at 400 . See also Lynch v. C ity of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 11 22, 1127 (9th Cir. 
1989) ; Seth F. Kreimer, Releases, R edress , and Police Misconduct: Reflections on A gree-
ments ro Waive Civil Rights A ctions in Exchange f or Dismissal of Criminal Charges , 136 
U. PA. L. R EV. 85 1, 934 (1988). 
106 Local and state governmental units differ significantly in their provisions for the 
defen se and indemnification of offi cers in c ivil ri ght s suit s . Some municipalities provide 
counsel, subject to ca se-by-case dete rminations regarding possible conflicts of interest with 
th e municipality itself. See, e .g. , Dunton v. County of Suffo lk , 729 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1984), 
vacated in part on other grounds , 748 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984) ; Kevlik v. Goldstein , 724 F.2d 
844 (1 st Cir. 1984) . In some jurisdi c tion s . in surance caniers wi ll provide counsel , while in 
others , the department may retain outside counse l to represent the officer or provide funds 
for the officer to do so. 
Practices also differ with respect to pa yment o f settlements or judgments . The munic-
ipalit y may pay such awards or provide indemnifica tion to the officer. Insurance may cover 
the se ttlement or judgment. In some jurisdic tions , recovery may be limited to the pocket 
of the individual defe ndant , who may be judgment proof. 
These va rying practices serve diffe rent interest s . Where the municipality pays the 
cos ts of li t igation (inc luding counsel ) and any mone tary awards, the plaintiff is assured of 
payment , but the re is virtua liy no dete rrent va lue with res pect to the officer (particu larl y 
where th e city does not otherwise dis c ipline o r retrain the officer). Where the officer is 
res ponsible fo r payment , de terrence is better se rve d, but at the poss ible cost of depriving 
the pla intiff of compensation. For ex tend ed discussions of th ese important competing 
interes ts , see PETER H. ScriUCK, Su iNG Go vE RNMENT: CITIZEN Rn.IEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRO NGS (1983); Ronald A. Cass , Damage Suits Against Public Ofi cers, 129 U . PA. L. 
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indemnification, recovery must be sought directly from the munic-
ipality. But under Section 1983, municipal liability can be estab-
lished only where a city policy, practice or custom has caused the 
constitutional violation; there is no respondeat superior liability. 107 
IV. An Agenda for Reform 
If the analysis I have made of the judicial and administrative 
responses to the mi sconduct involved in the Metropolis hypothet-
ical is con-ect, the measures necessary for reform are fairly ob-
vious. In the judicial arena, the Supreme Court must make signif-
icant doctrinal adjustments with respect to constitutional litigation. 
These changes should be tailored to the political and administrat ive 
realities of policing, and must take explicit account of the systemic 
nature of most forms of police abuse. 
The Court consistently considers operational exigencies of 
governmental law enforcement in its adjudication of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment claims. In those cases, in the balancing of in-
terests, weight has always been given to the "realities" and dangers 
of policing. 108 Recognizing the realities only on the governmental 
side has created a jurisprudence of consistent deference to law 
enforcement officials and an array of procedural obstacles to the 
vindication of personal liberties. 109 It is the politics of the Court, 
and not immutable legal doctrine , that will foreclose appreciable 
change in the Court's approach to police misconduct in the fore-
seeable future. 110 
Individual damage suits may continue to generate incremental 
changes in policy, particularly where the aggregate amounts in any 
particular locale become so large as to create a political issue 
concerning the public fisc. Similarly, if the courts develop the 
doctrinal kernel of City of Canton and require municipalities to 
adequately train, supervise and discipline police, we are likely to 
REv. 1110 (198 1); and Daniel 1. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations By Law 
Enforcement Officials: Plaintifs and Defendants As Private Attorneys Genera l, 88 CoLU1v1 . 
L. REV . 247, 283-86 (1988). 
107 See Monell v. New York Dep't of Social Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 658-59 (1978). 
108 See. e.g. , Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325 (1990); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649 (1984); Michigan v. Sum mers, 452 U.S. 692 (198 1); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S . I (1968). 
109 See supra notes 72-81. 
11° Cf. Payne v. Tennessee, Ill S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (Marshall , J., dissenting: 
"Powe r. not reason, is the new currency of thi s Court 's decisionmaking."). 
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see at least some police departmental response to seriously flawed 
procedures. 
However, it is unrealistic to rely on judicial intervention as a 
source of fundamental change. Regardless of the judiciary's re-
sponse, we must focus attention on other alternatives. The most 
important factor in the control and reduction of abuse is organi-
zational accountability. All other remedies will ultimately fail if 
not accompanied by a system of training, supervision and di sci-
pline that is structured to ensure that departmental policies relative 
to use of force and other restrictions on the arbitrary use of power 
are implemented and enforced . The numerous commissions and 
studies which have examined the problems of police abuse are 
unanimous in their recommendations: only a dramatic change in 
the enforcement of new norms of behavior by the police will 
di slodge the deeply entrenched culture that currently prevails.''' 
There are several possible ways in which the culture can be 
modified and in which practices that are more re spectful of the 
normative limitations on police power can be created. The pro-
cesses of reform involve different institutions in our society; to be 
successful, they must be mutually reinforcing. 
A. Police Administration and the Politics of Change 
Despite the formidabl e obstacles, there is some hope for in-
ternally generated police reform. There have been significant ad-
vances in recent years in the scope and quality of police training 
and in the development of official policies and practices. Most 
departments are managed by professionals who understand the 
harm to policing that is inflicted when communities are alienated 
from the police because of patterns of abuse. In part in response 
to court-imposed sanctions for the violation of rights-including 
exclusion of evidence from criminal prosecutions and monetary 
damages against police and municipalities-police departments 
have developed extensive training programs on the constitutional 
limits on critical police practices in the arrest, search, interrogation 
and other investigation areas. However, reliance on judicial inter-
1i 1 S ee LAIC , supra note 6, at 151-8 1; Kansas City Tas k Force, supra note 63, at 45-
49; Boston Police Report , supra note 63. 
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vention as a source of basic change is unrealistic. 112 Of course, as 
the Supreme Court continues to re strict constitutional rights of 
suspects , these important incentives for training and supervision 
will be reduced accordingly. 
Further, in some areas the police have taken the re sponsibility 
for changing abusive practices . For example, in the 1970s and 
l980s public concern over the unjustified use of deadly force led 
several departments to reconsider their regulations on this prac-
tice.m Years before the Supreme Court ruled that deadly force 
could be used to stop a fleei ng fe lon only where the suspect posed 
an imminent threat of seri ous physical harm, many police depart-
ments had limited deadly force to such si tu ations . As a result , the 
number of shootings decreased dramatically without any increase 
in harm to the police. 114 
The reasons fo r the police initiative on this issue were several , 
not the leas t of which was the political pressure of community 
groups and others concerned with the illegitimate use of such 
force. 11 5 Not only did the official rule s change, 11 6 but so did the 
I ~e Impos ition of municipal li ab ili ty und er Owen and Mon ell has prompted some 
changes in police practices. A st udy conducted pre-Monel! found that suits against individ-
ual officers had little impact on institu tional polici es. See Lant B. Davis , John H . Small & 
David J. Wahlberg, Project, Suing th e Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809-18 
( 1979). More recent studies credit th e threat of munic ipal li ability as an incentive to police 
departments to better train , supervise and discipline officers. See Candace McCoy, En-
forcem ent Workshop: Lawsuits Against Police-What Impact Do They Really H ave?, 20 
CRJM. L. BuLL. 49, 50-53 ( 1984); Wayne W. Schmidt, Section 1983 and the Changing 
Face of Police Mana gement , in PoLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 226, 235 (Willia m Geller 
ed ., 1985). See also Report Says Tighter Policies Reduce Killings by the Police, N.Y. 
T IMES, Oct. 20, 1986, at A20 (attributing police leadership in new restrictive shooting 
policies , in part , to the finan cia l influe nce of c ivi l litigation). The deterrent effect of civil 
damage payments by mu ni c ipaliti es on the conduct of indi vidua l officers, however, remains 
highly questionable. S ee Meltzer, supra note 106, a t 285-86. See also discu ss ion injl-a note 
141 and accompa nying tex t. 
I I J S ee James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: R esearch and R eform, 5 J usT. Q. 
165 (1 988) [hereinafter Deadly Force]; James J. Fyfe , Garner Plus Five Years : An Exami-
nation of Supreme Court In tervention into Police Discretion and Legislative Prerogatives , 
14 AM. J. CRIM. JusT. 167 (1990); Albert J. Reiss , Jr., Controlling Police Use of Deadly 
Force , 452 ANN ALS AM. ACA D. PoL. & Soc. SCI. 122 (1980). See also Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U.S. l (1 985). 
II• Fyfe, Deadly Force, supra note l 13, at 181 , 186-88 . See also Justice Department 
Battles Against Conflicts Between Police and Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, N ov. 13 , 1983, at 
A30 . 
II S See, e.g., Richard Higg ins, Debate Over Deadly Force, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 8, 
1983, at A I ; Judith Miller, N e1v Questions A rise on Policing Police , N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3 , 
1983 , a t 4. 
II
6 See, e. g . , Joe l J. Sm ith , Gun Use- A Dilemma for Police, D ETROIT NEws, Oct. 
22, 1981, at A I (describing policy changes in Detroit , Beverly Hill s and Dearborn , Michi-
gan); Arnold Markowitz , Ch iefs Revise Deadly Force Rules in Dade , MIAM I HERALD , Dec. 
15, 1983, at D1. 
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police culture. Violations of the policy resulted in discipline and 
retraining (and in some cases prosecution). 117 Police officers soon 
understood that their departments were serious about the new 
policies and adjusted their conduct accordingly. 118 That the new 
rules were imposed internally on a "voluntary" basis no doubt 
played a part in their overall acceptance . Indeed, the change in 
policy was so successful that , when the Court ultimately was faced 
with the constitutional issue, professional police organizations 
urged the Court to discard the broad and easily-abused fleeing 
felon rule. 119 
Other areas of police duties are equally amenable to significant 
internal change in norms and conduct. There is no reason why 
specific practices, for example, the use of police dogs, 120 non-
deadly weapons, 121 and the control of public demonstrations 122 
11 7 See Justice Departm ent Ballles Aga inst Conflicts Between Police and Minorities, 
supra note 114, at A30. 
118 For example, in 1980 in Philade lphia. after a mayora l campaign that focu sed in la rge 
part on the brutality of the city's police force, the new admini stration adopted strict 
limitatio ns on the use of deadl y force. and made it known that it was serious about 
enforcement. See SKOLNICK & FYFE , supra note 10. An officer told this author at the time 
that word had gone out in the department that "if you shoot, you had better be right." 
11 9 Fyfe , Deadly Force, supra note 113 , at 200 (brief of amici curiae against Tennessee 
and Me mphis Police Department in Garner was filed by the Police Foundation and joined 
by nine associations of police and criminal justice professionals, the chiefs of police asso-
ciations of two states, and 3 I law enforcement chief executives). 
120 The city of West Palm Beach, Fla. , has been held liable for its failure to adequately 
train and supervise its canine police unit. Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546 
(lith Cir. 1989) . The LAIC reported citizen complaints that Los Angeles police officers 
ordered their dogs to a ttack minority suspects who were already in police custody or under 
control. LAIC, supra note 6, at 77-78. 
121 Attention was focused on the use of electri c stun guns in 1985 when three New 
York City police officers were accused and convicted of using the devices to torture 
confessions from four men arrested on minor drug charges and other minor offenses. Joseph 
P. F1ied , Ex-Sergeant 's Release Ordered in Stun-Gun Case , N.Y. TIMES , Sept. 16, 1990, 
at 35; Robert D. McFadden , Youth 's Charges of Torture By an Officer Spur Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES , Apr. 22 , 1985, at B3. Electric stun guns deliver a 40,000-volt charge without inflicting 
permanent injury and leave only a pair of small burn marks on the skin. New York City 
Police Officers Convicted in 'Stun Gun' Case, CRtM. JusT. NEWSL., May 15 , 1986, at 7, 
8. At the time of the incident , many police departments across the country regularly used 
electric stun guns. Alleged Torture Brings Focus on Police Use of Stun Guns , CRJM. JusT. 
NEWSL., May 15, 1985, at 3. 
122 On the night of Augu st 6, 1988 , a demonstration of 150 to 200 people protesting the 
clos ing of Tompkins Square Park in Manhattan degenerated into four hours of fighting 
between the crowd and the officers policing the event. Todd S. Purdum, M elee in Tompkins 
Square Park: Violen ce and Its Provoca tion , N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14 , 1988 , a t AI. There were 
almost 100 complaints of police brutality ; 44 civilians and police officers were injured. !d. 
The police violence was attributed to poor planning, tactical errors, the youth and inex-
perience of the officers and a shortage of se rgeants and lieutenants. David E. Pitt, Roots 
of Tompkin s Sq. Clash Seen in Youn g and Inexperienced Officer Corps , N .Y. TIMES , Aug. 
25, 1988, at B7; Purdum, supra , at AI. As a result of the police riot , the N.Y.C. Police 
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cannot be subjected to careful study and control in a manner that 
limits possibilities for the abuse of power. As evidenced by the 
dramatic results achieved across the country in the difficult field 
of hostage takings, 123 training of special units that incorporate as 
a basic tenet the use of all means to save human life can produce 
remarkable improvements in police work. Over the years, the 
professionalization of this aspect of policing has substantially re-
duced the number of persons killed or injured in these volatile 
situations. 124 
Not all potentially abusive practices are as amenable to ad-
ministrative efforts at reform. The patterns of harassment, indign-
ities and violence that attend the everyday work of investigation, 
searches and arrests are far more resistant strains of misconduct, 
which emanate from a strong police subculture reinforced by po-
litical demands such as the "war on crime." If part of the com-
munity is seen as a deadly enemy, law enforcement tactics are 
bound to reflect that conception. 1f the resulting abuses are to be 
contained, more fundamental structural change will be required. 
One promising development is the practice of community-
oriented policing. This model is built on the premise that there are 
mutual community and police interests and that reciprocal respect 
for these concerns and interests will provide a more effective and 
progressive means of policing. Community policing relies less upon 
the practices of the past three decades which emphasized pro-
active, aggressive policing aimed at apprehension and prosecution; 
rather, it stresses the principle of police-community cooperation 
by increasing foot patrols, supporting community citizen patrols, 
and developing mutually acceptable goals for particular 
communities. 125 
Of course, the case for community-oriented policing can be 
overstated, and there should be no expectation that it alone will 
generate progressive change. If the police view this concept merely 
as a matter of labeling, as opposed to one of substantive change 
in which they have a voice and a stake, the program will not 
Department instituted "sweeping improvements in training, command structure and equip-
ment." Pitt, supra, at B7. 
' 23 See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 10; Robert W. Taylor, Hostage and Crisis 
Negotiation Procedures: Assessing Police Liability, TRIAL, March 1983, at 64. 
'
24 SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 10. 
' 25 LAIC, supra note 6. at 95-106: Boston Police Report, supra note 63, at 29-53. 
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succeed . 126 A necessary corollary to pol ice understanding and ac-
ceptance of community po licing as a new philosophy is the will -
ingness of community leaders to support effective and fai r policing , 
while at the same time condemning excesses and abuses. T he 
community shou ld not be held hos tage to a pattern of abuse as a 
quid pro quo for police protection. 
Civilian review of the po lice is a necessary component of a 
sys tem of accountability. 127 There has been bitte r debate about the 
concept of civilian review of police , but it is now firmly established 
in varying form s in th irty of our fifty largest cities. 12x The success 
of civilian review will depend in large part on the proper allocation 
of oower between oolice and civilians . l t is essential that the . . 
civilian oversight include the full povver to in vestigate complaints , 
conduct hearings , subpoena witnesses , inc luding police officers, 
and issue reports or findings on the complaints. If the civilian 
review board does not have authorit y to impose sanc tions, its 
recommendations for discipline should be given careful consider-
ation by the police commissioner. Civilian review procedures 
should also include the aut hority to make policy recommendations 
and to gather statistical data relevant to patterns of abuse. 
T he early intervention initiative utilized by an increasing num-
ber of police departments provides a related means of breaking 
the cycle of abuse. Statistical studies within various departments 
show a disturbingly disproportionate number of complaints re-
garding excessive force against re iatively few officers. 129 The fact 
that these numbers are as high as they are points to significant 
deficiencies in the monitoring and disciplining process. But even 
if internal discipline is effective, many officers rej ect fin dings made 
again st them in adversary administrative or judicial proceedings 
as the illegitimate products of a system that fa il s to understand the 
press ures and dangers facing the officer on the street. The officers 
116 Indeed , the Boston Police Department tried to implement a commu nit y poli cing 
program in March 199 1. It has been widely recogni zed as a fa ilure because the Department 
merely added community policing onto existing policies , rather than radically rethinking 
it s phil osophy of protection as a whole. Bos ton Pol ice Report. supra note 63, at 39, 44-51. 
127 See id . at 128-33. 
~ex Samuel Walker & Vic. W. Bumphu s, Civilian R eview of the Police : A National 
Survey of th e 50 Larges t Cities , 199 1, in F ocus : CRI M I NAL J uSTICE PoLICY I , No. 91-3 
(Dept. of Criminal Justice, Un iv. of Ne b. , 199 1). 
"~See, e .g ., LAIC , supra note 6, at 31-65; George Jo nes, Police to Tra ck Brutality 
Charges Against Officers, N.Y. TI MES. No v. 7. 199 1, at B2; Don Terry, Kansas City Police 
Force Go After Own 'Bad Boys, · N .Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 199 1, at A I. 
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may moderate their conduct for fear of sanctions, but their own 
standards and world view remain unchanged. 
For some officers who repeatedly engage in abusive conduct, 
an early intervention program based on principles of non-punitive 
retraining may be a more effective means of reducing unnecessary 
violence in police confrontations with citizens. These programs 
include a mix of retraining on rules governing use of force, role 
playing, psychological interviews and improving oral communi-
cation skills. In an experiment in Oakland, California, a police 
violence prevention unit used a peer review approach on street 
officers who, on average, had engaged in physical confrontations 
with citizens at a rate neariy four times that of non-participating 
officers. Over time, the officers who participated in this program 
reduced their violent incident records by more than fifty percent. 130 
B. Fed e red In t e rv en t ion 
In light of the nationwide scope of the problem, consideration 
should be given to federal intervention . The power of the federal 
government in enforcing the constitutional rights of citizens against 
local police officials has been bitterly disputed. 131 Historically, the 
Department of Justice has generally refrained from investigation 
and prosecution of local police abuse. The limits on federal au-
thority are largely self-imposed, although a narrow statutory au-
thority is also a contributing factor. The magnitude of the abuse 
problem calls for a substantial change of direction. 
The federal government has authority to bring criminal pros-
ecutions against state officers who violate or conspire to violate 
the civil rights of c itizens. 132 These criminal statutes require the 
government to prove that the defendant specifically intended to 
130 See HANS Toc H & J. DouGLAS GRANT, PoucE AS PROBLEM SoLVERS 242-43 (1991). 
13 1 The traditional argument against intervention is deeply ingrained . For example, 
John Dunne, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice 
Department, stated during Congressional hearings on police brutality in the wake of the 
Rodney King incident: "We are not the ' front-line' troops in combatting instances of police 
abuse. That role prope rly li es with the internal affairs bureaus of law enforcement agencies 
and with state and local prosecutors. The federal enforcement program is more like a 'bac k-
stop' to these other resources .'' John Dunne, Statement to the House Subcommittee on 
Civil and Constitutiona l Right s of the House Judiciary Committee (March 20, 1991) [here-
inafter Dunne Statement), quoted in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICE BRUTALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 4-5 (July 199 1). 
I ) ~ )8 U.S.C. §§ 241 , 242 (1988). 
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deprive the victim of a constitutional right, 133 a factor that is often 
cited by the Justice Department as the reason why there are so 
few police abuse prosecutions. 134 It is unlikely that the failure of 
the federal government to prosecute police can be so easily ex-
plained. It is far more likely that the reasons behind the lack of 
federal prosecutions are the same as those explaining the paucity 
of state prosecutions: prosecutors do not like prosecuting fellow 
law enforcement officers (with whom they work on a day to day 
basis); evidence of such misconduct is often shie lded by the code 
of silence; victims are more readily subject to impeachment (prior 
records, life styles, etc.); and juries are inclined to give the benefit 
of the doubt to the police. 135 
On the civil side, the Justice Department lacks authority to 
bring injunctive actions even where police abuse is alleged to be 
widespread .136 Congress can give the Attorney General the power 
to bring litigation to protect against widespread violations of con-
stitutional rights. Congress has authorized injunctions in cases of 
employment discrimination, 137 discrimination in public accommo-
dations, 138 deprivation of voting rights 139 and, for persons in pris-
ons, mental institutions and nursing homes, where "egregious or 
flagrant conditions which deprive ... persons of any rights, priv-
ileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States." 140 
Without the availability of private or public enforcement of 
constitutional rights in this area, local governments are free simply 
133 See, e.g ., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966). 
134 The FBI investigates approximately 2500 complaints of police abuse per year. Dunne 
Statement, supra note 131 , at 5. However, very few of these result in prosecution. Mr. 
Dunne has stated that in the three years preceding the Rodney King incident, there were 
98 prosecutions in this area. !d. Yet , in the City of Los Angeles, despite documented cases 
of serious abuse, no prosecutions had been initiated in several years. Hoffman, supra note 
65 , at 4-5. The jurisdictional confines of the federal law have provided a rationalization for 
not doing so. 
llS See supra notes 60 , 83- 85, 88, 91, 99 and accompanying text. 
ll6 In United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1980) , the Justice 
Department sought an injunction again st the police department of the City of Philadelphia 
to end the department's "practice of violati ng the rights of persons they encounter on the 
streets and elsewhere in the city ," a departmental policy "implemented with the intent and 
the effect of inflicting abuse disproportionately on black and Hispanic persons." /d. at 190. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Ci rcuit refused to recognize an implied power in the 
federal government to bring an action to enjoin violations of constitutional rights. /d. at 
192-201. 
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1988). 
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1988). 
139 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1988). 
14o 42 U.S. C. § 1997a (1988). 
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to pay as they go for the violation of the rights of their people 
without any possibility of judicial intervention to prevent abuses 
before they occur. In Los Angeles, even the payment of more than 
$10 million in police abuse judgments in 1990 alone (more than 
$1,000 per sworn officer in the LAPD) has had no perceptible 
impact on these problems. 141 
Legislation introduced in Congress in the wake of the Rodney 
King incident would allow greater federal intervention. The Attor-
ney General and aggrieved individuals would be authorized to 
bring pattern or practice suits. 142 In recommending these provi-
sions, the House-Senate conference proposed the use of injunc-
tions to meaningful ly address patterns of police abuse. 1·B 
The bill would a lso require the Department of Justice to com-
pile and publish data on the use of excessive force by police 
officers. 144 The lack of information on the incidence of excessive 
force and other forms of police abuse is a significant barrier to 
both political and legal reform. 145 Without credible information on 
the scope and pervasiveness of the problem, the public is left with 
the impression that the abuses are more aberrational than sys-
temic. Significant changes on the national level will not occur 
unless there is detailed evidence that the abuse is not isolated or 
local in nature. 
The federal government has a large program of assistance to 
local law enforcement agencies under the Office of Justice Pro-
141 John L. Mitchell, $11.3 Million Paid in 1990 to Resolve Abuse Cases, L.A. TIMES , 
Mar. 29, 1991, at A!. In other cities, payment of similarly high figures as compensation for 
police abuse does not seem to deter such activity. See, e.g., Sean Murphy, City Paid $3.4 
Million in Ci~·i/ Suit Settlem ents in '88, BosTON GLOBE, May 14 , 1989, at 29 (police 
misconduct cases cost city $1 . l million out of total $3.4 million paid) . Part of the reason 
stems from the fact that , in most cases, the police officer faces no financial risk or other 
disciplinary sanctions if hi s conduct leads to a civil suit. See discussion supra note 106. 
Even being sued repeatedly does not necessarily hinder promotion or assignment to elite 
training or narcotics units . Bill Wallace, San Francisco Pays in Many Suits Against Cops, 
S.F. CHRON., May 30, 1990, at A!. Provisions for municipal payment of settlements and 
judgments may suffice to compensate victims of police abuse, but unless taxpayers are 
offended by the amounts pa id or police departments consider such judgments in di sci plining 
their officers , the re will be little deterrence of individual officers' behavior from these 
payments . 
141 See H.R. 2972, l02d Cong., Jst Sess . (1991). This proposal has been incorporated 
in part by the Senate-House conferees on the "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 199!. " H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 405, J02d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1991). 
143 H .R. CoNF. REP. No . 405 , l02d Cong. , 1st Sess. at 97. 
144 !d. 
145 H UMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Sll[ira note 131 , at 8. 
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grams. 146 It is appropriate for the federal government to establish 
standards for the use of force, including the proper use of weapons, 
and for internal review of police performance. Further, meaningful 
and institutionalized respect for constitutional rights should be a 
condition of the receipt of federal funds for law enforcement. 147 
V. Conclusion 
On April 29, 1992, as this Article was about to go to press, a 
jury without any African-Americans (drawn from a conservative 
suburban community) returned a ve rdict of not guilty as to all the 
officers charged with beating Rodney King. This shocking verdict 
touched off widespread protests and rioting in Los Angeles and 
other cities around the country. While the reasons behind the jury 's 
conclusion are not yet clear, the verdict unfortunately confirms 
the thesis of this Article: the law and order mentality that has 
pervaded the consciousness of America, coupled with strong ele-
ments of racism, lead many to believe that the police should retain 
a free hand in order to protect "us" from "them." 
The Rodney King incident demonstrates once again the tragic 
consequences of our failure as a society to respond to the systemic 
and institutional aspects of police abuse. Official misconduct en-
dures in large part because we respond to its many manifestations 
in an episodic manner. As long as the courts and both federal and 
state government treat police abuse as a series of isolated inci-
dents, or as a regrettable by-product of the war on crime, the 
Monroes, Rafts and Rodney Kings will continue to pay an uncon-
scionable price for our misguided policies. Police violence will be 
contained only if we challenge fundamental aspects of police cul-
ture and hold the police politically and legally accountable. Ex-
perience teaches that structural problems require structural rem-
edies. We ignore that lesson at the pe1il of individual victims of 
abuse, the core values and institutions of constitutional govern-
ment and the very integrity of our society. 
'"6 For example, the Bureau of Justice Assistance Grant Programs can make direct 
grants to local law enforcement agencies for the acquisition of equipment and other pro-
grams dedicated to improving the criminal justice system. 42 U.S.C. § 3751 (1988). 
1" 7 It is a common device under federal law to condition a grant upon compliance with 
some other provision of federal law, and it is a lready used in the federal law enforcement 
assistance programs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 3789(d) (1988) , for example, a federal grant for 
local law enforcement may be suspended if it is found that the local body has discriminated 
in employment on the basis of race, religion , nationality or gender. 
